Prospects For Pentecostal Philosophy

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Prospects for Pentecostal Philosophy Assessing the Challenges and Envisioning the Opportunities

J. Aaron Simmons

Furman University, Greenville, South Carolina,USA [email protected]

Abstract

In this essay, I offer a constructive vision for the future of pentecostal philosophy. Specifically, I first offer a series of sociocultural challenges that pentecostal philoso- phy faces. Then I offer a short timeline of philosophical engagement from pentecostal thinkers over the past several decades. In order to open a more productive space for pentecostal philosophy moving forward, I argue that pentecostal philosophy needs to rethink its ties to Plantinga-type confessional Christian philosophy. In this way, pen- tecostal philosophy should not be reducible to a kind of pentecostal theology. Draw- ing on Sarah Coakley’s appropriation of feminism for philosophy of religion, I sug- gest that pentecostal philosophy can facilitate a way of responding appropriately to two audiences (theological and philosophical) without simply circumscribing one into the other. I conclude by contending that pentecostal philosophy should be affectively engaging, argumentatively rigorous, and existentially relevant.

Keywords

pentecostal philosophy – Christian philosophy – James K.A. Smith – metaphilosophy – hermeneutics – methodology – Sarah Coakley

When I first took Introduction to Philosophy as an undergraduate, I was warned that studying philosophy would threaten my pentecostal faith.1 Once I started studying philosophy in earnest in graduate school, my mom began praying

1 Throughout this essay, I am following the lead of James K.A. Smith, who uses a lower-case

‘p’ to reflect what he calls “big-tent pentecostalism” (James K.A. Smith, Thinking in Tongues:

Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy(Grand Rapids:MI: Eerdmans, 2010)).

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daily that the Lord would protect my mind (which I greatly appreciate, by the way). Recently a good pentecostal friend of mine, who is also a history pro- fessor, referred to pentecostal philosophy as being an oxymoron. In light of these experiences, I am reminded that someone once said that the most impor- tant thing about Christian philosophers is that they exist at all. I am not sure that claim is true about Christian philosophers, but I do think that it might be true about pentecostal philosophers. Unfortunately, judging from the chuck- les I get from philosophers and the warnings I get from pentecostals, neither philosophers nor pentecostals seem very aware of the possibility—much less the existence—of pentecostal philosophy. Despite some excellent work in this area, such consternation about the very idea of such effort remains widespread in both pentecostal churches, on the one hand, and professional philosophy, on the other hand.

In 2003, James K.A. Smith published an essay entitled “Advice to Pentecostal Philosophers.”2 Therein, Smith attempted to do for Pentecostals what Alvin Plantinga had done for Christians more broadly: encourage them to approach philosophy boldly from within their faith commitments.3 Following this ini- tial call, Smith expanded his “advice” into a book-length articulation of pen- tecostal philosophy. Smith’s Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophywas a watershed publication, and, in many ways, all those attempting to do pentecostal philosophy now must either go through Smith or explain why not. I give Smith such a privilege of place here for two reasons. First,Thinking in Tongues is, at present, the only book-length consideration of what it means to engage in pentecostal philosophy, as such. Second, Smith is one of the only major contributors to the debates in this field who holds a Ph.D. in philosophy as opposed to theology, religious studies, or related fields.4 Accordingly, I focus on his work here not to position it as better than others but simply because the text more centrally relates to the specific questions I consider regarding the best ways of understanding pentecostal philosophy as a determinate discourse in relation to Christian philosophy.

Itwouldbe wrongtosaythat the leveehas brokenin the decade since Smith’s book appeared and that pentecostal philosophy is now an established subfield. Nonetheless, even though still not frequent in scholarship on pentecostalism,

2 James K.A. Smith, “Advice to Pentecostal Philosophers,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology 11,

no. 2 (2003): 235–247.

3 Alvin Plantinga, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,”Faith and Philosophy 1, no. 3 (1984): 253–

271.

4 Smith holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from Villanova.

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and largely absent in mainstream debates in philosophy, essays on philosoph- ical themes or thinkers have begun appearing more often. Despite Smith’s determinate account, it is worth noting at the outset that there is nosinglehis- torical thing that pentecostal philosophy “is.” Indeed, pentecostal philosophy has occurred in a variety of different veins as inspired by a range of different methodologies and thinkers. In particular, notable work has been done specif- ically engaging and appropriating the work and legacy of Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, William Alston, C.S. Peirce, Alvin Plantinga, and even critical theorists such as Giorgio Agamben and Slavoj Žižek.5 Due to this important work, there is no longer much need to argue that pentecostal philosophy is pos- sible; the question now is how best to engage in it.

In particular, questions remain at the metaphilosophical level regarding the relation between pentecostalphilosophyas distinct from pentecostaltheology. Accordingly, I will suggest that Smith’s account of pentecostal philosophy high- lights some important characteristics that operate across this otherwise diverse field and, I believe, serve to narrow its impact and its influence in relation to the discipline of philosophy more broadly: namely, whether primarily analytic, continental, or pragmatic, almost all of pentecostal philosophy to date is rightly considered “Christian philosophy” as understood according to a specifically Plantinga-type conception.6 According to this approach, theological commit- ments are taken to operate as foundational (basic) for one’s inquiry such that theological authorities are legitimately able to be imported into philosophical discourse from the outset. On this model, the boundary between philosophy

5 For engagements with MacIntyre and Alston, see Simo Frestadius, Pentecostal Rationality:

Epistemology and Theological Hermeneutics in the Foursquare Tradition (London: T&T Clark,

2020). For a sustained consideration of Taylor, see James K.A. Smith, How (Not) to be Sec-

ular: Reading Charles Taylor (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014). For deep appropriations

of Peirce, see Amos Yong, “The Demise of Foundationalism and the Retention of the Truth:

What Evangelicals Can Learn from C.S. Peirce,” Christian Scholars Review 29, no. 3 (Spring

2000): 563–588;Spirit—World—Community:Theological Hermeneutics inTrinitarian Perspec-

tive (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002); andThe Dialogical Spirit: Christian Reason and The-

ological Method in the Third Millennium (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014). For pentecostal

engagements with critical theory, see Nimi Wariboko,The Split God: Pentecostalism and Criti-

cal Theory(Albany,NY: State University of New York Press, 2018).

6 Importantly, this does not mean that there is a similar appropriation of Plantinga’s specifi-

cally Reformed theological commitments, which certainly are prominent in Smith’s account

of pentecostal philosophy. Instead, my focus is on the metaphilosophical conception of how

to conceive of the relation between authority and evidence across philosophical and the-

ological communities. It is here that I take nearly all of the currently existing pentecostal

philosophy to reflect a Plantinga-type commitment to the porous relation between philoso-

phy and theology.

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and theology is not merely porous but quite blurry. Although this Plantinga- type Christian philosophy is an influential approach that has gained signifi- cant traction in analytic philosophy of religion over the past few decades, it is not the only way to understand things. Christian philosophy can and, I con- tend, should be more methodologically diverse and may become even more compelling when viewed as decidedly philosophicaland not simply a different mode of philosophicaltheology.

Although my goals in this essay are metaphilosophical, it is important to note that pentecostal philosophy also faces significant challenges because of the way that pentecostalism itself is culturally manifest in a specifically North American context. Hence, in what follows, I will first articulate what I take to be the most pressing sociocultural challenges faced by pentecostal philosophy. Then, in order to show the diversity of work that has occurred, I will offer a gen- eral guide to the existing literature in the field. Subsequently, I will turn to the metaphilosophical questions by engaging Smith’s specific account of pente- costal philosophy in order to consider how it might be problematically narrow in ways that could be helpfully expanded by moving beyond Plantinga-type strategies. Drawing on the work of Sarah Coakley, I will suggest that pente- costal spirituality offers benefits to philosophy at least because it can help to reframe what it means to do Christian philosophy in the first place—namely, Plantinga-type approaches are not the only, and maybe not even the best, game in town. I will conclude with a note of encouragement to emerging voices in the field regarding the style of pentecostal philosophy and the importance of not being boring. I have tried to structure this essay along the broad lines of pen- tecostal liturgy: (1) testimony, (2) greeting your neighbor, (3) sermon, and (4) a participatory altar call. Also, following the reference list, everyone is invited to a covered dish luncheon in the fellowship hall … assuming a praise break doesn’t derail things halfway through the essay!

Testimony: Facing the Challenges

In his important book, Pentecostal Rationality: Epistemology and Theological Hermeneutics in the Foursquare Tradition, Simo Frestadius compellingly argues that pentecostal epistemology should be understood as importantly located within the tradition’s historical communities. Following the epistemic frame- work provided by Alasdair MacIntyre, Frestadius suggests that we can only ever really consider pentecostal philosophy and theology by taking seriously the context in which it has emerged and continues to find itself. Similarly, Nimi Wariboko contends that philosophical engagement with pentecostalism

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should begin by considering “everyday folk engaged in pentecostal practice.”7 Hence, I want to begin with something of a tradition-specific testimony regard- ing my own identity as a pentecostal philosopher and the context in which my identity has been formed in order to explore the sociocultural challenges that pentecostal philosophy faces.

I am a fourth-generation Pentecostal (on both sides of my family). My mater- nal grandfather, Rev. Ernie T. Hitte, was a pastor in the Church of God, Cleve- land. My wife and I both went to Lee University (a Church of God institution), where both of my parents were professors for many years. Along with our son, we currently attend an Assemblies of God church in Greenville, South Carolina. Just saying this about my background likely generates all sorts of assumptions about who I am, what I care about, and how I see the world. Usually, such an introduction would immediately raise suspicion from the philosophical com- munity about my ability to do rigorous intellectual work.

I am also a professional philosopher who specializes in postmodern philos- ophy of religion. I have published numerous books on such topics as French phenomenology, existentialism, and democratic political theory. I currently serve as the president of the Søren Kierkegaard Society (USA) and tend to lean progressive in many of my social views. Usually, such an introduction would immediate raise suspicion from the pentecostal community about my ability to remain fully committed to my Christian identity.

I wish I could say that being a postmodern pentecostal philosopher was an easy thing to navigate, but unfortunately, these different aspects of my iden- tity do not always socially harmonize in ways that I would like.8 This ten- sion does not result from my own commitments (I genuinely don’t see much doxastic conflict), but rather from the assumptions operative so deeply—and often invisibly—both in so many pentecostal communities and also, albeit dif- ferently, in the community of professional philosophy. Yet, for my part, both aspects of my identity directly inform each other in important ways. For exam- ple, I am committed to postmodern epistemology in part due to my pentecostal conceptions of how reality is structured and embodiment should motivate humility. Moreover, I am propelled more deeply into pentecostalism by the way phenomenology and existentialism encourage taking seriously the affec- tive dimensions of relational existence. So, when I say that I don’t see these two parts of myself as at odds, what I mean is that each serves to cultivate a deeper

7 See Wariboko,The Split God, xx.

8 See J. Aaron Simmons, “Apologetics After Objectivity,” in Reexamining Deconstruction and

Determinate Religion, ed. J. Aaron Simmons and Stephen Minister (Pittsburgh,PA: Duquesne

University Press, 2012), 23–59.

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engagement with, and embrace of, the other. Things are not so easy, however, when I cross from philosophy conferences to church services.

My experience has been that the consternation I receive from philosoph- ical colleagues is always a matter of incredulous surprise, which is then able to be overcome by modeling philosophical rigor. But the resistance I receive from my evangelicalized pentecostal churches is nearly always a matter of out- right opposition. Importantly, I have never been asked to leave a philosophical community due to my religious identity, but I have been asked to leave many churches due to my philosophical identity being perceived as a threat to eccle- sial unity and stability. Although I have written elsewhere about my own diffi- culties in this area,9 what matters for our purposes here is that the practice of pentecostal philosophy cannot be simply engaged as a disciplinary conception, but must also be considered within the context of sociopolitical and ecclesial cultures that often serves to be more of an obstacle to pentecostal philosophy than anything faced within philosophy departments.

Since I will be focusing on Smith’s metaphilosophy later, it is helpful, here, to consider his specific account of possible sociocultural objections to pen- tecostal philosophy in order to unpack these cultural/ecclesial obstacles and better understand the situation (or, following Frestadius, we might even say “tradition”). For Smith, there are two such objections to pentecostal philos- ophy that are prominent within pentecostal communities: (1) philosophy is necessarily opposed to Christianity, and (2) theology can do everything that philosophy can do, but with less risk to our faith.10Let’s term the first worry an ecclesialconcern and the latter adisciplinaryone. In light of my own experience and the contemporary American social context, I think that we should relocate these two challenges as more appropriately lying within the domains of poli- tics and hermeneutics respectively. In addition to these two challenges, I want to highlight two others that Smith doesn’t address. I will position these addi- tional challenges as being a matter of economicsandepistemology. I take these to be challenges to pentecostal philosophy, but as situated within a broader American cultural logic of broadly (predominantly white) evangelical Chris- tian identities.

First, the political challenge is simply that many within pentecostal eccle- sial and social communities see philosophy as a liberal banana peel, as it were, that will start one on the slippery slope to atheistic hedonism. This view, I

See J. Aaron Simmons, “Personally Speaking … Kierkegaardian Postmodernism and the Messiness of Religious Existence,”International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24, no. 5 (2016): 685–703.

Smith, “Advice to Pentecostal Philosophers,” 237.

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believe, is why philosophy programs at many Christian colleges are housed within theology departments—where a firmer doctrinal hand can be held as a requirement for belonging to the community. Similarly, this view makes the 2014 film God’s Not Dead, directed by Harold Cronkso, powerful for conserva- tive Christian audiences: philosophers are depicted as a dangerous lot who allow questioning to lead to a softening of theological resolve and ultimately to abandoning Christian faith altogether. Protecting against philosophy’s sec- ularizing and liberalizing temptations ends up being presented and framed both in Christian colleges and in popular Christian culture as a move in the “culture war” against “Christian” values. Were it not for such worries about a “culture war,” I am not sure if the popular books, films, small group curricula, podcasts, and public debates that characterize the apologetics industry would exist.11 It can often seem within this apologetics industry that defending the “Truth” (always with a capital T) is less a matter of Christianity and more one of conservative social values.

I take it that this political challenge is a version of Smith’s own ecclesial con- cern. For Smith, the ecclesial concern is motivated by an uninformed reading of Colossians 2:8.12 However, perhaps contra Smith, I don’t find that Pente- costals are primarily opposed to philosophy due to an incorrect understanding of Pauline doctrine. Instead, I think that the situation is reversed: they tend to hold such problematic readings of Paul due to the theological framing in which political conservativism so often gets socially and culturally presented. As such, Smith’s ecclesial worry is, I believe, better understood as reflecting a conservative political identity. The real danger, then, is not philosophy per se, but philosophers who are likely to seduce young minds away from such a conservatively (both politically and theologically) framed notion of correct belief. In a time when many popular conservative cultural figures warn against sending Christian kids to college because of the supposed hedonistic and sec- ularist indoctrination that occurs, it is no wonder that those who would try to defend the importance of Christian colleges do so by framing non-Christian institutions as actively dangerous to the faith of our youth. Interestingly, these worries about philosophers are nothing new: the same charges were leveled against Socrates—corrupting the youth and atheism. Philosophers, it seems, have never been very popular among the powerful, whether their domain is social or ecclesial.

I do not mean to include the technical work in apologetics occurring in the philosophical literature, which I see as an entirely different, and specifically professional, discourse. Smith, “Advice to Pentecostal Philosophers,” 237.

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Moving on to Smith’s second concern, there is a disciplinary exclusivism problematized by the idea of pentecostal philosophy. Specifically, this is the view that philosophy is unnecessary because theology is sufficient for Chris- tian thinking and living. Interestingly, this view depends upon a deflationary biblical hermeneutics such that the Bible and proper theology are sufficient for all areas (or at least the vast majority of them) of Christian life. Although dimensions of this approach may be laudatory—for example, the egalitar- ian approach to interpretive access and the inclusive conception of ecclesial participation that might follow—its opposition to philosophical expertise is decidedly worrisome. If all anyone needs is the Bible and the Spirit’s “illumi- nation” for how to read it, say, then there is very little room left for the work of pentecostal philosophy.13Interestingly, this view alsoleads to a diminished and problematic view of theology itself. In this way, philosophy and robust construc- tive/comparative/critical theological work can end up being perceived, as we saw in the political challenge, as actually detrimental to the purity of the gospel message. Smith’s disciplinary concern, then, is perhaps best understood as a hermeneutic challenge because the deflationary biblical hermeneutics makes philosophical training at least irrelevant, and maybe actively hostile to being appropriately receptive to the leading of the Spirit required to understand it.14

In addition to these two challenges articulated by Smith, I want to offer a third economic challenge. This concern follows from but is not identical to the hermeneutic challenge. It is the idea that philosophy is not simply dangerous (political) orunnecessary(hermeneutic), butuseless. Attending this view is the idea that the goal of life is to be successful as supported by the “initial evidence,” we might say, of economic wealth. Philosophy, like other humanistic fields, is assumed not to make you rich and so is, therefore, better off just avoided. I find the economic challenge to be the main contemporary social face of old pen-

Indeed, this hermeneutic would make almost any other academic discipline unnecessary, including biblical studies.

Importantly, many contemporary pentecostal theologians comment on the lack of any systematic theological work in early pentecostalism for similar hermeneutic reasons. As Christopher Stephenson even suggests, it is due to a lack of philosophical training that early pentecostal theology is weaker than it could have been: “Early pentecostal theologians did not have the philosophical training necessary for thorough theological reflection. This is not to say, of course, that they did not have their own philosophical presuppositions, but they were unable to achieve a critical perspective of their presup- positions because they lacked broad exposure to various philosophical problems and approaches” (Christopher Stephenson,Types of PentecostalTheology: Method, System, and Spirit [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013], 4). For more on the development of pente- costal hermeneutics, see Lee Roy Martin, ed.,Pentecostal Hermeneutics: A Reader(Leiden: Brill, 2013).

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tecostal anti-intellectualism.15 For many Pentecostals, and Evangelicals more broadly, the only hermeneutic that seems to matter is “success”—as judged in quantitative terms (size of audience, amount of money received, degree of influence on sitting political figures, and so forth). Unfortunately, the problem- atic ties between contemporary pentecostalism and the so-called prosperity gospel serve to reinforce this monetary conception of a success hermeneutic.16

For example, the widespread impact of such “rock star” pastors such as Joel Osteen, John Gray, and Paula White can often make it seem as if build- ing a larger audience is more important than encouraging a faithful commu- nity defined by neighbor love. For these pastors and those who have seem- inglyreplacedtruth-seekingwithseekingculturalandpoliticalinfluence,living faithfully has seemingly been replaced by living rich. When applied to higher education, and the study of philosophy specifically, living into the glorious untimeliness of the “costly grace” of God’s calling is now far too often replaced by seemingly only hearing God’s call when it is toward a business, pre-law, or pre-health major as guided by an economic calculus regarding a financial return on monetary investment.

Finally, I want to mention a broadly epistemic challenge that I think pente- costal philosophers face from the community of Christian philosophy, specif- ically. Many Christian philosophers have tacitly identified the historical anti- intellectualism associated with pentecostalism as reason to be suspicious of pentecostal approaches to philosophical work. There are a variety of compli- cated reasons for the distinctive emphasis on Reformed or Catholic commit- ments within Christian philosophy.17 Nonetheless, given that most Christian philosophers begin from within such confessional frames of reference, there is often some suspicion that gets tacitly expressed about seemingly less intellec- tual religious approaches to philosophical work.

This epistemic concern is not without some warrant on two fronts. First, given the first three challenges already discussed, it does seem that many within evangelicalized pentecostal communities do express a general anti- intellectualism regarding philosophical work. Second, Christian philosophers

15 16

See Mark A. Noll,The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind(Grand Rapids,MI: Eerdmans, 1994). For a pentecostal approach to rethinking such economic conceptions, see Nimi Wariboko, GodandMoney:ATheologyof MoneyinaGlobalizedWorld(Lanham,MD:LexingtonBooks, 2008); and Economics in Spirit and Truth: A Moral Philosophy of Finance(Albany,NY: State University of New York Press, 2014).

See J. Aaron Simmons, “Introduction: Why This? Why Now?” inChristian Philosophy: Con- ceptions, Continuations, and Challenges, ed. J. Aaron Simmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 1–17.

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have had to struggle for intellectual legitimacy throughout much of the lat- ter half of the twentieth century. Accordingly, when taken together, these two aspects amount to a challenge of “branding,” as it were. Namely, it makes sense that those associated with contemporary Christian philosophy would hesitate to affiliate with other Christian traditions that might be perceived by critics to give further evidence of Christian philosophy’s lack of rigor. Considering pente- costalism’s stress on emotion, affect, and experience, on the one hand, and con- temporary evangelical worries about humanistic education, on the other hand, it might seem reasonable for Christian philosophers to be wary of increased pentecostal integration into the field.

When faced with these various challenges, pentecostal philosophers have a lot of work to do both socially and academically. But, here’s the thing:engaging in pentecostal philosophy can be a great tool for resisting such political and eco- nomic assumptions operative within pentecostal cultural and ecclesial life and, to some degree, even within Christian philosophy, itself. Inhabiting a world in which God’s Spirit continues to work and move requires that Pentecostals not live in fear but rather exhibit lives characterized by humility, hospitality, and gratitude. Were philosophers to live into God’s calling in this way, the notion that political disagreement automatically reflects theological opposition and the idea that economic success is the measure of a meaningful life would both be incompatible with the performative hermeneutic of pentecostal life. To this end, Pentecostals must resist being equated (and maybe even identified) with contemporary American (predominantly white) Evangelicalism, which is increasingly often not much more than merely a conservative political ideology with a bunch of God-talk thrown in.18 Pentecostalism is not just about affirm- ing this or that claim about the existence and nature of God, it is about living with others in light of God’s Spirit living in us.

Ultimately, as I have argued elsewhere, the affective awareness that pente- costal philosophy brings to bear on current philosophical practices, far from being reason to fear its influence on Christian thinking, can facilitate thinking more critically about the proper functioning of Christian philosophy. Indeed, perhaps ironically, Christian philosophy is often able to unpack the unacknowl- edged premises of a particular argument, but then frequently remains content to allow its own social framing of particular theological commitments to go unchecked. By stressing the role of embodied affect in our thinking and living, pentecostal philosophy can, I believe, foster greater self-awareness and critical

See John Fea, Believe Me: The Evangelical Road to Donald Trump (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerd- mans, 2018).

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humility within Christian philosophy more broadly.19 In that spirit, and hope- fully inthat Spirit, then, let’s look at the pentecostal scholars who have modeled how to press into God’s gracious invitation to “reason together” (Isaiah 1:18), by thinking and living (!) philosophically.

Greeting Your Neighbor: The Emerging History of Pentecostal Philosophy

Origin myths are usually fraught with problems because there are always antic- ipatory gestures and events that give rise to what is then, in retrospect, taken to be the “origin.” Pentecostal forays into philosophical inquiry have been widely varied and so resist easy definition or rigid association with a particular philo- sophical approach. Nonetheless, I want to give something of a general timeline of engagement that will highlight many of what I take to be the key moments and essays in the still emerging history of pentecostal philosophy. Exactly what work will endure as part of the “origin myth,” as it were, remains yet to be determined—but the thinkers and texts mentioned here are strong contenders for essential reading for anyone interested in pentecostal philosophy.

When it comes to some sort of official beginning of pentecostal philosophy, as a discrete practice, we can roughly date its origin around 1999–2000 when James K.A. Smith and Amos Yong were conceiving and subsequently proposing a “Philosophy Interest Group” (PIG) within the Society for Pentecostal Theology (SPS). The records indicate that the initial “organizational” meeting occurred in 2000, and the first papers were officially presented as part of the PIG at the 2001SPSmeeting.20

Evenif pentecostalphilosophycameinwiththenewmillennium,therewere prior essays in what we would probably best termpentecostal philosophical the- ology that hinted toward the possibility of a PIG and the eventual emergence of pentecostal philosophy proper. One essay that stands out is Joseph Byrd’s “Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutical Theory and Pentecostal Proclamation.”21Byrd’s

For a more developed argument regarding the affective dimension of pentecostal philos- ophy, see J. Aaron Simmons, “Philosophy: Inspiration for Living Relationally and Thinking Rigorously,” in Routledge Handbook to Pentecostal Theology, ed. Wolfgang Vondey (New York and London: Routledge, 2020), 399–409.

I am very grateful to Smith, Yong, Jack Wisemore, and Doug Olena for helping me put together this timeline of the beginning of thePIG.

Joseph Byrd, “Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutical Theory and Pentecostal Proclamation,” Pneuma15, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 203–214.

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essay stresses the importance of relating contemporary pentecostal hermeneu- tics to the homiletic task found in the first decade of pentecostalism. This essay has particular import for the eventual development of pentecostal philosophy because it anticipates three key aspects that eventually became hallmarks of a distinctively pentecostal approach to philosophical inquiry: (1) the continued work of the Spirit, (2) a rejection of modernist forms of rationality, and (3) a decisively affective and embodied approach to knowing.22

The years from 1999 to around 2005 saw a flurry of essays in pentecostal philosophy. Of particular note is Amos Yong’s “The Demise of Foundational- ism and the Retention of Truth: What Evangelicals Can Learn from C.S. Peirce.” This essay considers pentecostal epistemological options in response to the rise of anti-foundationalism occurring in light of postmodernism, on the one hand, and postliberalism, on the other hand. Highlighting the epistemic humil- ity that results from Peirce’s nonfoundationalist epistemology, Yong contends that it is possible to affirm truth in ways that remain consistent with pente- costal/evangelical theological commitments “even if knowledge is admitted to be foundationless.”23 Building on this early essay arguing for the postmod- ern/pragmatic tendencies in pentecostal philosophy, Yong’s seminal Spirit— Word—Community offered an enduring model of constructive philosophical engagement with theological method. Therein, still drawing heavily on prag- matic intuitions, Yong argues for a broadly critical realist approach to doing theology in philosophically responsible ways.

Moving from epistemology and methodology to the philosophy of educa- tion, in a 2001 essay entitled “Toward a Pentecostal Philosophy of Education,” Jeffrey S. Hittenberger argues that “Pentecostal experience and theology have relevance for the educational philosophies and practices of Pentecostal edu- cators, a relevance that opens fascinating possibilities for further research and development.”24Similarly, Cheryl Bridges Johns’sPentecostal Formation: A Ped- agogy Among the Oppressed and her later essay “Athens, Berlin, and Azusa: A Pentecostal Reflection on Scholarship and Christian Faith” offer models for phi- losophy of education. Johns echoes Byrd’s emphasis on the role of feeling and stresses that pentecostalism is “transrational.”25 In line with Yong’s defense of

22 23 24

See Smith, “Advice to Pentecostal Philosophers,” 245; andThinking in Tongues, 12. Yong, “The Demise of Foundationalism,” 564.

Jeffrey S. Hittenberger, “Toward a Pentecostal Philosophy of Education,”Pneuma 23, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 217–244, 218.

Cheryl Bridges Johns, Pentecostal Formation: A Pedagogy Among the Oppressed (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993); “Athens, Berlin, and Azusa: A Pentecostal Reflection on Scholarship and Christian Faith,”Pneuma27, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 136–147, 136.

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Peirce’sepistemicfallibilism,Johnsencouragesdialogicalhospitalityandwarns that “talking only among ourselves is of limited help,” because it can “produce a ‘Pentecostal ghetto’ that stands in danger of epistemological arrogance.”26 Johns, like Yong, Hittenberger, Byrd, and Smith, illustrate that all future work that would be rightly labeled “pentecostal philosophy” should be defined by discursive hospitality motivated by a realization of the Spirit’s continual action in the world.

Despite these early philosophical gestures, Smith’s essay “Advice to Pente- costal Philosophers” really marks the moment when “pentecostal philosophy” gets presentedas such. As already mentioned, Smith’s “Advice” is issued in rela- tion to Christian philosophy as conceived and conducted by Alvin Plantinga: “Plantinga’s clarion call and program for a Christian philosophy provides a model for the development of a distinctly Pentecostal philosophy.”27This “dis- tinctly” pentecostal approach is offered as something of a corrective to what Smith takes to be the problematic tendencies to confuse Christian philosophy with a generalist “theistic” philosophy. Smith worries that unless we are even more confessionally specific than Plantinga proposes, the “distinctiveness” of Christian philosophy will likely become compromised. So, rather than begin- ning with a proposition such as “God exists,” we should begin by affirming “a relationship with the Triune God who has revealed himself—uniquely—in Christ, and more specifically God in Christ as he gave himself on the cross.”28 Smith offers pentecostal philosophy as a “specified” version of Christian phi- losophy rooted in an “incarnational starting point.”29

Smith then goes on to offer what he takes to be five distinctive aspects of the pentecostal worldview underlying such philosophical work. Here I will present them as articulated inThinking in Tongues:

1. A position of radical openness to God.

2. An “enchanted” theology of creation and culture.

3. A nondualistic affirmation of embodiment and materiality.

4. An affective, narrative epistemology.

5. An eschatological orientation to mission and justice.30

After Smith offers his “Advice,” essays in the newly branded “pentecostal philo- sophical” program begin to appear a bit more frequently in the pentecostal literature—though still extremely rarely in mainstream philosophical journals.

26 27 28 29 30

Bridges Johns, “Athens, Berlin, and Azusa,” 137. Smith, “Advice to Pentecostal Philosophers,” 244. Smith, “Advice to Pentecostal Philosophers,” 244–245. Smith, “Advice to Pentecostal Philosophers,” 245. Smith,Thinking in Tongues, 12.

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Not surprisingly, Smith’s specific account of pentecostal philosophy variously gets criticized, revised, expanded, and embraced by others. For my part, the main issue I have with Smith’s list is that he continues to refer to these aspects as distinctive/unique to pentecostalism.The only way in which I think such dis- tinctiveness might show up is as a conjunction of all five components, since any one of them could easily be found in other Christian traditions and denomina- tional frameworks. Unfortunately, Christian thinkers tend too often to empha- size the stability and uniqueness of Christian identities, rather than admitting the productive dynamism and plurality that sometimes operates even within the same tradition.

Other than Smith, by far the most prominent voices in pentecostal philo- sophical work have been Amos Yong and Nimi Wariboko. Yong has contributed to debates in hermeneutics, epistemology, political philosophy, disability stud- ies, and religious pluralism. In addition to his important work on theological method,31 let me mention just a few other examples of his philosophical con- tributions. In particular, consider Yong’s proposal of a “consensual hermeneu- tic,”32his suggestion that Smith needs a “pneumatological assist,”33his account of an almost Levinasian approach to Christian ethics,34 his approach to pen- tecostal political theory,35 his constructive vision of a Christian approach to disability studies,36 and, building on his early work on Peirce, his decidedly pragmatic approach to postmodernism.37

Alternatively, Wariboko has become one of the most sustained pentecostal voices engaging traditions such as critical theory and psychoanalysis. Wari- boko’s The Split God: Pentecostalism and Critical Theory38 is especially impor-

31 32

37 38

See Yong,Spirit—World—Community.

Amos Yong, “The Hermeneutic Trialectic: Notes Toward a Consensual Hermeneutic and Theological Method,”Heythrop Journal45 (2004): 22–39.

Amos Yong, “Radically Orthodox, Reformed, and Pentecostal: Rethinking the Intersec- tion of Post/Modernity and the Religions in Conversation with James K.A. Smith,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology 15, no. 2 (2007): 233–250. See also Simo Frestadius, “In Search of a ‘Pentecostal’ Epistemology: Comparing the Contributions of Amos Yong and James K.A. Smith,”Pneuma38 (2016): 93–114.

Amos Yong, Hospitality and the Other: Pentecost, Christian Practice, and the Neighbor (Maryknoll,NY: Orbis, 2008).

Amos Yong, “Pentecostalism and the Political—Trajectories in Its Second Century,” Pneuma32 (2010): 333–336.

Amos Yong,The Bible, Disability, and the Church: A New Vision of the People of God (Grand Rapids,MI: Eerdmans, 2011).

Yong,The Dialogical Spirit.

See also Nimi Wariboko, The Pentecostal Principle: Ethical Methodology in a New Spirit (Grand Rapids,MI: Eerdmans, 2012); and Economics in Spirit and Truth.

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tant in demonstrating the various postmodern threads upon which pente- costalism can draw productively. In contrast to Smith’s more deconstructive and phenomenological interlocutors, Wariboko brings global grassroots pente- costalism into conversation with such critical theorists as Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Giorgio Agamben. Turning to determinate pente- costal communities in Africa, Wariboko argues that the “data and issues that form the basis of our engagementwith critical theory come fromeverydayprac- tices of Pentecostals rather than from academic theologies and doctrines of God.”39 Modeling how to take seriously religious practice as an anchor for our theological and philosophical endeavors, Wariboko’s approach invites us to be wary of thinking that pentecostal philosophy can exist solely within the halls of academia. Instead, those halls should be ruptured by lived practice, which is then ripe for critical unpacking. Even though I have significant hesitation about the promised use of critical theory for such ends (as opposed to existential- ist/phenomenological directions), Wariboko’s work is an important reminder that pentecostal philosophy cannot be reduced to a singular model of thinking or living.

In addition to the work of Smith, Yong, and Wariboko, many other schol- ars have offered what can rightly be viewed as contributions to pentecostal philosophical scholarship over the past decade or so. As just a few examples of such work, consider Kenneth J. Archer’s work on pentecostal hermeneutics as well as L. William Oliverio’s substantive study of the various hermeneutic threads in classical pentecostalism,40 Bradford McCall’s attempt to read Com- mon Sense Realism through a pentecostal lens, as well as McCall’s more recent critical pneumatological (and panentheistic) engagement with David Hume’s arguments against miracles,41Steven Félix-Jäger’s book on pentecostal aesthet- ics,42and Enoch S. Charles’s pentecostal approach to Kantian ethics and divine action.43

39 40

Wariboko,The Split God, xii.

Kenneth J. Archer, A Pentecostal Hermeneutic for theTwenty-First Century: Spirit, Scripture, and Community(New York: T&T Clark International, 2004; repr.CPTPress, Cleveland,TN: 2009); L. William Oliverio, Jr.,Theological Hermeneutics in the Classical Pentecostal Tradi- tion: A Typological Account (Leiden: Brill, 2012). See also Kenneth J. Archer and L. William Oliverio, Jr., eds., Constructive Pneumatological Hermeneutics in Pentecostal Christianity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

Bradford McCall, “The Pentecostal Reappropriation of Common Sense Realism,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology 26 (2017): 59–75; “A Critical Analysis and Response to Hume from a Pneumatological Perspective,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology26 (2017): 233–251. Steve Félix-Jäger, Pentecostal Aesthetics: Theological Reflections in a Pentecostal Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics(Leiden: Brill, 2015).

Enoch S. Charles, “Divine Moral Assistance and Modern Science: Kantian Ethics in Dia-

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The special 2018 issue of Pneuma devoted to the work of Charles Taylor should also be mentioned because it stands as an important moment in the his- tory and development of pentecostal engagements with contemporary philos- ophy. Therein, a variety of scholars engage Taylor’s A Secular Ageas a resource for thinking about pentecostal identity and its relationship to a broader social history of secularization.44

In concert with the broadly historical concerns that motivate much of Tay- lor’s work, Simo Frestadius’s Pentecostal Rationality is especially important for the way it invites us to think about how pentecostal epistemology is always located within specific historical traditions and determinate communities. Drawing on MacIntyre and deeply engaging William Alston, Frestadius looks specifically at the historical context and doctrinal development of the Elim Pentecostal Church as a helpful lens through which we can see the ways that pentecostal philosophy needs to be considered as an historically embedded phenomenon rather than an abstract speculative endeavor.

Given that pentecostal philosophy (or explicitly philosophical theology) is generally a discourse that has only emerged in the past several decades, the range of philosophical topics that have been considered is quite remarkable given the otherwise still low number of self-consciously pentecostal philoso- phers.45 As already noted, almost all of the work bringing pentecostalism and philosophy together has been written by scholars without advanced degrees specifically in philosophy. As a result, most of the work mentioned above still self-identifies as primarily theological in motivation and orientation. That said, one trend that has been quite consistent throughout pentecostal philosophical

logue with Pentecostal Participatory Ontology and Theology of Divine Action,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology26 (2017): 214–232.

See especially L. William Oliverio, “The Work of Charles Taylor and the Future of Pente- costalism,”Pneuma 40, nos. 1/2 (2018): 5–16; Michael J. McClymond, “The Geist of Hegel Past and Present: CharlesTaylor’sASecularAgeand the Claims of Christian Faith,”Pneuma 40, nos. 1/2 (2018): 58–70; Yoon Shin, “Pentecostal Epistemology, The Problem of Incom- mensurability, and Creational Hermeneutic: The Harmonious Relationship Between Affective and Cognitive Knowledge,”Pneuma40, nos. 1/2 (2018): 130–149; Caroline Redick, “Spirit Baptism as a Moral Source in a Secular Age,”Pneuma40, nos. 1/2 (2018): 37–57; and Wolfgang Vondey, “Religion at Play: Pentecostalism and the Transformation of a Secular Age,”Pneuma40, nos. 1/2 (2018): 17–36.

For my own occasional contributions to what could be considered pentecostal philosophy, see J. Aaron Simmons, “Apologetics After Objectivity”; “Kierkegaard and Pentecostal Phi- losophy,” in Kierkegaard’s God and the Good Life, ed. Stephen Minister, J. Aaron Simmons, and Michael Strawser (Bloomington and Indianapolis,IN: Indiana University Press, 2017), 227–251; and “Philosophy: Inspiration for Living Relationally and Thinking Rigorously.”

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engagements, though, is the broadly postmodern and specifically either conti- nental (in Smith’s andWariboko’s cases) or pragmatic (inYong’s case) approach that is taken to be consistent with pentecostal spirituality. Even Frestadius’s recent approach in Pentecostal Rationality is explicitly postmodern in general terms, though in a more tradition-specific MacIntyrean sense.

For better or worse, the generally postmodern/continental/pragmatic ap- proaches of pentecostal philosophical work are starkly at odds with the dom- inant analytic approach of most of the work in contemporary Christian phi- losophy. One essay that stands out as an important counterexample to this trend toward a broadly continental approach within pentecostal philosophy is Christopher A. Stephenson’s “Should Pentecostal Theology be Analytic The- ology?”46 Illustrating the latent theological orientation of much pentecostal philosophical scholarship, Stephenson hopes that “if at least some pentecostal theology were to become analytic theology, Pentecostals could both find it eas- ier to see their theological labors as forms of spiritual practice and write clear and precise speculative theology in part to incite such spiritual practices in their readers.”47 Despite Pierre Hadot’s compelling argument that philosophy was originally “a way of life” devoted to cultivating particular “spiritual prac- tices,”48it is likely that a proposal that contemporary philosophical work (pen- tecostal or otherwise) should be directed at “incit[ing] … spiritual practices in their readers” will meet with some consternation among wide segments of the philosophical guild.49

Even if there are reasons to worry about the specifics of Stephenson’s account, it is helpful as a reminder that pentecostal philosophy must not become narrowly identified with any single philosophical methodology (such as phenomenology, critical theory, or analytic theology) or exclusively with any single philosophical tradition (pragmatism or existentialism, for example). Instead, in line with my own encouragement of a “mashup” approach to philo- sophical work whereby we draw on whatever philosophical resources are rele-

47 48

Christopher A. Stephenson, “Should PentecostalTheology Be AnalyticTheology?”Pneuma 36 (2014): 246–264. See also Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea, eds., Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Christopher A. Stephenson, “Should Pentecostal Theolgoy be Analytic Theology,” p. 263. Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Malden,MAand Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

See Bruce Ellis Benson, “The Two-Fold Task of Christian Philosophy of Religion,” inChris- tian Philosophy: Conceptions, Continuations, and Challenges, ed. J. Aaron Simmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 83–103.

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vant to the questions at hand,50pentecostal philosophy should display a plural- ist and dynamic engagement with both the history of philosophy and its con- temporary expressions. In this way, pentecostal philosophers ought mutually to appropriate the logical rigor and conceptual precision of analytic philosophy as well as the hermeneutic awareness and focus on embodied material existence occurring in continental philosophy. As I see it, the affective, embodied, and experiential dynamics that characterize pentecostal spirituality make it espe- cially ripe for philosophical analysis that cuts across traditional oppositions within philosophical discourse. In this way, the broadly postmodern sensibili- ties (whether then enacted in a more continental or analytic mode) of pente- costal philosophical reflection should reasonably invite a pluralist approach to philosophical style and method.

Despite this emerging history, the future of pentecostal philosophy is still quite uncertain. In addition to the sociocultural obstacles that we have already considered, one of the main challenges that I think pentecostal philosophy faces concerns its relationship to Christian philosophy. Despite the remark- able diversity that can be seen in the history of pentecostal philosophical work, cutting across nearly all of this research is a Plantinga-type assumption about the relation of theology to philosophy. As already mentioned, nearly all of the essays we have considered here are explicitly presented as philosophicaltheol- ogy, and nearly all of the scholars writing them are trained either in religious studies or in theology rather than in philosophy specifically. This is not, prima facie, a problem—indeed, philosophy and religious studies should have more engagement, not less. Moreover, the backgrounds and specific training upon which these scholars draw is a genuine strength for pentecostal scholarship. However, it is very much an open question within the philosophical literature whether philosophy should draw upon theological epistemic authorities in the way that Plantinga-type Christian philosophy recommends. My point here is not to suggest that such Plantinga-type work is not philosophy but simply to note that there are potentially good reasons to understand things differently and thus to engage in “Christian philosophy” without allowing theological con- fessionalism to operate as an authoritative subtext.

In the next section I will suggest that the tacit embrace of a Plantinga-type approach to Christian philosophy potentially serves to limit the effectiveness of pentecostal philosophy. When this relationship is reconsidered along different lines, however, I contend that it can be a resource for propelling pentecostal philosophy forward.

See J. Aaron Simmons, “Introduction: On the Dialectical Promise of Mashup Philosophy of Religion,” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory14, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 204–210.

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Sermon: Pentecostal Philosophy as Christian Philosophy?

Having suggested that pentecostal philosophy originates in roughly 1999–2000, that would locate it as occurring approximately thirty years after the estab- lishment of the SPS itself (which was founded in 1970, held its first meeting in 1971, and published the first issue of Pneumain 1979).51Importantly, theSPS was founded with a dual identity due to a dual audience: “Unlike strictly aca- demic societies such as those for church history or biblical studies, and unlike strictly religious societies, the SPS stands, sometimes uncomfortably, with a foot in each camp.”52 Indeed, this twofold task of speaking to the academy and to the church has characterized pentecostal scholarship from its begin- ning.

Smith emphasizes this duality particularly in the way he locates pente- costal philosophy as a particular branch of Plantinga-type Christian philos- ophy.53 Again, I am using Smith here because he is the most explicit in this metaphilosphical commitment, but I find it to underwrite nearly all of the existing literature in pentecostal philosophy. “Christian philosophers,” Smith states, “will demonstrate more autonomy by establishing an agenda that arises from their own faith commitments and their service to their own (distinctive) faith communities.”54Summarizing this view, Smith explains:

This leads to what Merold Westphal describes as the ‘two hats thesis’: the Christian philosopher has two audiences (the church and the academy) and even two allegiances (first to the church and secondarily to the academy …). As such, we also have two vocations: to serve the Christian community but also to be a witness and testimony to the academy.55

In light of Smith’s appropriation of Westphal’s “two hats thesis,”56 we should then ask whether these two hats can individually be put on at different times,

54 55 56

Robby Waddell and Peter Althouse, “A Brief History of Pneuma: The First Forty Years,” Pneuma 40 (2018): 1–4. See also Mark E. Roberts, ed., The Society for Pentecostal Theology: Commemorating Thirty Years of Annual Meetings (1971–2001) (The Society for Pentecostal Theology,2001).Availableonlineat:http://storage.cloversites.com/societyforpentecostalstu dies/documents/sps_30_anniversary_monograph.pdf (accessed January 20, 2019). D. William Faupel and Kate McGinn, “The Society for Pentecostal Theology: A Brief History,” inThe Society for Pentecostal Theology, ed. Mark E. Roberts (2001), 4–6, 6.

For more on the varieties of approaches to Christian philosophy, see J. Aaron Simmons, “Introduction: Why This? Why Now?”

Smith,Thinking In Tongues, 9.

Smith,Thinking in Tongues, 9.

Merold Westphal, “Taking Plantinga Seriously: Advice to Christian Philosophers,” in

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or one theological hat ultimately covers up or replaces the other philosophical one. For example, Smith sees the pentecostal philosopher’s role in the academy as being a Christian witness—but this just seems like one, quite explicitly theo- logical, hat.

Elsewhere I have argued that, despite my own personal and professional indebtedness to Plantinga-type Christian philosophy, it is “bad strategy” within the current philosophical academy and broader sociocultural context.57 My basic concern is that it adopts a defensive and combative approach that ends up narrowing and insulating its own discourse rather than opening it up to crit- ical interlocutors.58 In this way, I have proposed that we view contemporary Christian philosophy as facing something of a mid-life crisis that frequently attempts to regain its former glory at the cost of being blind to its current sit- uation.59Even if such self-protective moves were reasonable when a discourse was new and under existential threat, that doesn’t mean that they continue to be the best option in a time of power. Indeed, even Plantinga himself recently noted that a dangerous temptation for contemporary Christian philosophy is “triumphalism.”60

Unfortunately, the vast majority of pentecostal philosophical work often depends on and extends the occasionally defensive posture of Plantinga-type Christian philosophy. For example, in light of the political and economic chal- lenges to pentecostal philosophy already discussed, when Smith claims that “given the fact that we are within our ‘epistemic rights’ to pursue our own agenda, we need to exhibit confidence and boldness—‘Holy Ghost boldness’— in the development and pursuit of such a philosophic program,”61 the appeal to “rights” is likely to be viewed as tin-eared by those with whom one disagrees: I have the right to stand here and you can’t make me move! Similarly, notions of “Holy Ghost boldness,” though entirely well motivated, threaten to reinforce the theological insularity that underwrites so much of our contemporary social

J. Aaron Simmons, ed., Christian Philosophy: Conceptions, Continuations, and Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 73–82.

See J. Aaron Simmons, “The Strategies of Christian Philosophy,” in J. Aaron Simmons, ed., Christian Philosophy: Conceptions, Continuations, and Challenges(Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2019), 187–208.

See Kevin Schilbrack, Philosophy and the Study of Religions: A Manifesto (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2014), chap. 1.

See J. Aaron Simmons, “Cheaper than a Corvette: The Relevance of Phenomenology for Contemporary Philosophy of Religion,”Sophia56, no. 1 (2017): 33–43.

Alvin Plantinga, “Response to Nick Wolterstorff,”Faith and Philosophy28, no. 3 (2011): 267– 268.

Smith,Thinking in Tongues, 15.

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discourse: Not only do I have the right to stand here, it is in the name of God that I do so! The problem with such moves is that rather than wearing both hats, pentecostal philosophers can just end up wearing one all the time (even if it gets turned backward occasionally).

In contrast to Smith’s vision of the discourse, I want to suggest that the greatest single contribution that pentecostal philosophy can make to Christian philosophy is to challenge the idea that Christian philosophy is something nec- essarily done within tightly confessional communities. As I see it, the affectively motivated “radical openness to God” that Smith takes to be distinctive about pentecostal spirituality should also cause us to be radically open to the voices of those who hold different pre-philosophical commitments, affirm different political ideologies, embrace different theological views, and display different methodologies. If pentecostals fundamentally affirm the importance of being open to God “doing somethingdifferentlyornew,” as Smith suggests,62then we should embrace the possibility of doing Christian philosophydifferentlyas well.

Simply put, Westphal’s “two hats” thesis only works if we allow them to remain genuinely dual such that philosophy is not reducible to theology. Hav- ing to wear a theological hat and a philosophical hat at different times simply reflects the complicated reality of having to speak variously to two audiences without being inconsistent. This is extremely hard work because when we try to expand those to whom we speak, as Westphal so powerfully notes, “we may need to become more popular and less technical in some of our writing.”63But, the difficulties go far beyond simply finding different and more accessible ways to communicate.The real challenge is finding ways to remain committed to our theological communities, and the authorities operative therein, while simulta- neously being hesitant to allow such authorities to function immediately or obviously in relation to our philosophical inquiry.

I think that pentecostal philosophers can and should express such hesitancy. Again, I have never seen any insurmountable doxastic conflict between my pentecostal identity and my philosophical profession (though there are cer- tainly some pentecostals who think I hold views that conflict withtheir partic- ular understanding of pentecostal theology!).We just have to stop thinking that being consistent means appealing to the same authorities for both audiences. While speaking to a theological/confessional/ecclesial audience, appealing to revealed texts, the Spirit, or broadly established dogma is entirely appropriate because of the confessionally determinate historical community in which one

62 63

Smith,Thinking in Tongues, 12.

Merold Westphal, “Taking Plantinga Seriously,” 74.

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stands, but when speaking to a room of philosophers, Christian or otherwise, the arguments offered should be made compelling without appeals to special revelation that exclude, in principle, substantive portions of the philosophi- cal community itself. By keeping these two hats distinct, we are better able to navigate the boundary between theology and philosophy in broadly Thomistic ways such that the “reason” and “evidence” to which one appeals as a theolo- gian, oras a philosopher, is helpfully distinguished. The simple point is that by appealing to evidence not recognized by other members of the philosophical community we effectively shut them out as productive interlocutors. Alterna- tively, philosophy and theology are more effectively considered together when we do not reduce philosophy to theology, but instead allow both to resound as individually contributing to the integration of the life of the mind and the life of faith.

As we follow Smith’s own impressive example of being more accessible in some of our writing, we should also follow Westphal’s example such that we become more nuanced in the way we allow evidence to function within our work. Extending the “hat” metaphor a bit, consider that a wool beanie is proba- bly not the best option for playing tennis in the summer, but wearing a baseball cap is probably not ideal for a winter hike. The affective and embodied focus of pentecostal theology can, and should, motivate a robust perspectivalism that challenges our confessional starting points as applicable equally in all discur- sive communities. Far too much Christian philosophy is simply confessional theology that appropriates philosophy for its own aims. Even though nearly all extant pentecostal philosophy is rightly thought of as philosophical theology, there is nothing necessary about this way of doing things. Pentecostal philoso- phy doesn’t need to follow this Plantinga-type example of how to understand the functioning of Christianin “Christian philosophy.”

When we stress that the two authorities operate in light of and in response to the two audiences, we do not, in most cases, have to decide between them in some sort of absolute way. We don’t have to think that, with due respect to Tolkien, there isone hat to rule them all. My suggestion is that pentecostal spir- ituality can help Christian philosophy to be rethought as not necessarily con- fessional, but always decidedly personal—hence my testimonial section in this paper. Starting from one’s own narrative and tradition as the context in which particular questions arise is not the same thing as starting from within one’s own faith commitments as default premises in one’s argument. As an example of how this might work, let’s look at Sarah Coakley’s account of feminism as a resource for analytic philosophy of religion.64

Perhaps ironically, Westphal suggests that there is a confessional similarity between the

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Rather than viewing feminism as some sort of members-only discourse, Coakley presents it as an important experiential archive upon which to draw in doing what we might term a philosophical gap-analysis by which we are able to see what we might otherwise overlook. Coakley suggests that by drawing on feminist philosophy, philosophers of religion can overcome assumptions asso- ciated with what she terms the “generic male” that so often functions as the default setting within debates associated with the problem of evil.65Appropri- ating feminism allows for hearing those voices that are so often made invisible by a masculinist framing of the discourse. Coakley goes on to contend that the concept of God so often found within philosophy of religion tends to yield a discourse that misses a “sustained or positive reflection on the nurturing and all-encompassing dimensions of divine love.”66 In response, Coakley argues that a feminist approach can offer robust resources for thinking more effec- tively about the possibility of a relational God.

Notice that Coakley’s appropriation of feminism is not confessional in the sense that it assumes an authority structurewithin feminism that is unavailable to male philosophers. Instead it is personal such that it offers experiential and embodied insight into the blind spots that so often get formed when we are not self-critically aware. Christian philosophy needs to be rethought according to a similar strategy: different audiences require not only that we speak in different ways but also that we use the different evidential sources that are operative for specific audiences.When we shift from one audience to another, it is important not to carry those authorities with us. Instead we should find ways to make the case to that audience based on evidence that it may have overlooked, ignored, or inappropriately dismissed. For example, I explain things differently to my ten-year-old son than I do tomy forty-year-old colleagues.Yet, this doesn’tmean that the account to my colleagues is “better” than that to my son, but simply that each is differently appropriate given the audience. But, as all parents know, sometimes explaining things to children helps us improve our explanation to colleagues. In structurally similar ways, pentecostal philosophy is distinctly sit- uated to help Christian philosophy engage in self-critical reflection about its own task and best practices.

communities of Christian philosophers and feminists (“Taking Plantinga Seriously,” 75). For a consideration of Coakley and pentecostal theology, see the special issue of the Jour- nal of Pentecostal Theology26, no. 1 (2017).

Sarah Coakley, “Feminism,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed., ed. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn (Malden,MA:Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 689–694, 689–690.

Coakley, “Feminism,” 691.

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A movement begun by those outside of the social power structure, pente- costalism has, from the outset, called our attention to the fact that when we get too committed to our conception of God, God tends to interrupt us (I think of glossolalia as a divine interruption of our own ego: when God speaks, the requirement of epistemic humility finds linguistic expression).67 Pentecostal philosophy then should not be viewed as simply a distinctive form of Christian philosophy but as a critical challenge to the way in which Christian philosophy understandsitself.

As something of a case study, let’s return to Smith’s five characteristics of the pentecostal approach to see how they can be productive resources for overcoming both the sociocultural and metaphilosophical obstacles to pen- tecostal philosophy. I already mentioned the “openness to God” that Smith describes but consider also that the “enchanted theology of creation and cul- ture” suggests that things are more than they seem—even as concerns one’s own Christian commitments and their cultural or philosophical expression.68 As a result, dialogical hospitality and epistemic humility should both follow from a pentecostal approach, which would likely help to overcome the epis- temic obstacle. Additionally, a “nondualistic affirmation of embodiment and materiality” might require being open to reconceiving our own religious com- munity’s notion of howembodiment relatestosuch things as raceand sexuality andhowmaterialityrelatestoconsumerism(whichwouldgoalongwaytoward addressing the ecclesial obstacle discussed earlier).69 An “affective, narrative epistemology,” similarly, might be better cashed out as an invitation to being personally available to others—exposed and vulnerable to them, rather than as claiming one’s place in the sun in accordance with one’s “rights” (which would plausibly help to resist the political obstacle). Finally, an “eschatological ori- entation to mission and justice” should challenge our assumptions about the political and economic framing of our own organizations, whether ecclesial or professional.70

Smith rightly says that pentecostal philosophy has distinctive contributions to make to Christian philosophy. I have suggested, though, that even accord- ing to his own account of the pentecostal worldview, pentecostal philosophy is so open, embodied, affective, narratival, and dynamic that it should resist being fitted into the mold of Plantinga-type conceptions of the discourse such

68 69 70

I think that there are some possible resonances here with Wariboko’s discussion of the “split self” enacted by pentecostal practice (see Wariboko,The Split God).

Smith,Thinking in Tongues, 12.

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that pentecostal philosophy is plausibly understood as a particular form of pentecostal theology. When we expand things accordingly, pentecostal spiri- tuality can motivate the diversity we see in pentecostal philosophy; yet, fail- ing to acknowledge and challenge the slippage between the behind-the-scenes theological and philosophical authorities threatens such diversity. In this way, rather than rejecting what has come before, it turns out that the specifics of Smith’s own postmodern account, the narratival approach of Frestadius, the pragmatic critical realism of Yong, and the critical theoretical work of Wari- boko, for example, all become more compelling. When we relate to each of these proposals as invitations to expand our conceptions of what it means to be a pentecostal, a Christian, a philosopher, and a social being, they can help us to think about our shared reality. Rather than reading them as restricted accounts of some sort of pentecostal litmus test, we can appropriate them as instances in which our professional practice can embody the Holy Ghost hospitality that should define a tradition anchored in being ruptured by God rather than being aligned with the powers of “this world.”

Altar Call: On Not Being Boring

Having considered the history of pentecostal philosophical engagement and the present sociocultural and metaphilosophical obstacles that attend its cur- rent practice, how, then, should we move forward into the expanded vision I have attempted to sketch? Well, let’s get personal again.

I didn’t just grow up in pentecostal churches, I have played drums in them for over twenty years. Multi-hour altar calls and nonstop double-time beats with walking bass lines were nothing out of the ordinary for me. As I see it, affective pentecostal worship is not simply an opener; it is often the main event. When I am behind the drums, “playing in the Spirit,” as it were, the relational dynamics of pentecostal theology are not found primarily in speculative thought but in lived engagement.

Due to this specific style of embodied performance and community engage- ment, pentecostal worship is rarely confused with that of many other Christian traditions. I think this distinctively active and expressive approach to worship should spill over into all areas of our philosophizing: teaching, speaking, and research. Simply put, as kenotically open to two different audiences and plu- ralistically drawing on analytic, continental, pragmatic, and feminist resources, pentecostal philosophy should not be boring! In no way does this mean that pen- tecostal philosophy can be excused for being sloppy, but rigor and precision do run up against existential realities that might lie phenomenologically beyond

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propositional expression. For my part, this is why I think that so much of pente- costal philosophy displays sympathies with continental philosophy’s embrace of metaphor, poetics, and, dare we say it, the playfulness of linguistic dance!71 Nothing is gained by being opaque, but there is a lot to lose if we allow our audiences (whether students, colleagues, or congregants) to fall asleep—as can happen in both analyticand alsocontinental modes. In other words, dozens of numbered premises (on the one hand) and dozens of German or French names (on the other hand) both risk missing the existential traction that a philoso- phy anchored in one’s personal investment in a living tradition should seek to maintain.

Thus, to emerging pentecostal philosophers, my own “advice” would be the following. Be clear, but don’t forget to be compelling. Be technical, but don’t fail to be accessible. Be professional, but don’t be impersonal. I propose that this is how we should hear Smith’s suggestion that “a pentecostal philosophy will not simply be a detached philosophical reflection on charismatic phenomena; it will be a charismatic reflection on philosophical questions.”72

I am not sure what the future of pentecostal philosophy will hold, but at present established scholars continue to maintain active research agendas as emerging scholars such as Spencer Moffatt andYoon Shin are entering the field. As far as I am concerned, the future looks bright indeed. Although challenges to pentecostal philosophy remain, I want to encourage others to take up the call to this field. It will be hard work figuring out how to wear two hats, but you will be surrounded by a cloud of witnesses of pentecostal scholars who have already blazed a trail for you to follow. So come now, let us reason together (Isaiah 1:18), and maybe evendancealong the way.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to John Sanders, Kevin Timpe, Katy Attanasi, and Amos Yong for helpful comments on early drafts of this essay. Additionally, I am very appre- ciative of Louis Morgan’s research expertise.

See Vondey, “Religion at Play.” See also Nimi Wariboko, The Pentecostal Principle: Ethical Methodology in New Spirit (Grand Rapids,MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 161–170.

Smith,Thinking in Tongues, 16.

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Prospects For Pentecostal Philosophy

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